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Abstract
In 1996 free choice of health insurers has been introduced in the German so-
cial health insurance scheme.Competition between insurers was supposed to
increase efficiency. A crucial precondition for effective competition among
health insurers is that consumers search for lower-priced health insurers. We
test this hypothesis by estimating the price elasticities of insurers’ market
shares. We use unique panel data and specify a dynamic panel model to ex-
plain changes in market shares.Estimation results suggest that short-run price
elasticities are smaller than previously found by other studies.In the long-run,
however,estimation results suggest substantial price effects.
JEL-Classification:I18,C33
Keywords:Competition,generalized method of moments,health insurance
* Stefan Greß, University Duisburg-Essen; Marcus Tamm, RWI Essen and Ruhr-University
Bochum; Harald Tauchmann, RWI Essen; Jürgen Wasem, University Duisburg-Essen. The
authors are grateful to Boris Augurzky,Jörg Breitung,Christoph M.Schmidt,and to participants
at the RAN (Risk Adjustment Network)-meeting for helpful comments and to Nadine Heck and
Muhamed Kudic for research assistance. They also would like to thank Dostal & Partner
(www.dostal-partner.de) for providing most of the data. All correspondence to Marcus Tamm,
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI Essen), Hohenzollernstr. 1–3,
45128 Essen,Germany,Fax:+49-201-8149236,Email:tamm@rwi-essen.de.“The exit option is widely held to be uniquely powerful: by inflicting revenue
losses on delinquent management, exit is expected to induce that ‘wonderful
concentration of the mind’ akin to the one Samuel Johnson attributed to the
prospect of being hanged“ (Hirschman 1970).
1. Introduction
In the mid 1990s Germany and several other European countries such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland undertook major reforms of their social health
insurance systems. In Germany consumers were given free choice of social
health insurers starting in 1996. The concept of managed competition can be
seen as blue print for reform in these countries (Enthoven 1988,1993).1 Man-
aged competition implies that risk-bearing health insurers compete with each
other based on price and quality.Furthermore,this concept presumes that in-
surers induce non-efficient providers to work more efficiently and provide
good quality. Otherwise, they are not contracted and drop out of the market.
Finally managed competition assumes that consumers have free choice be-
tween insurers and exercise their right to choose – at least to some degree.
This paper tests the last assumptions – for competition between health insur-
ers to be effective, (i) consumers must have some choice between them. In
Hirschman’s terminology: consumers must have the exit option (Hirschman
1970; Schlesinger 1995). At the same time, a crucial precondition for the suc-
cess of reforms providing a higher degree of choice is that (ii) consumers are
inclined to search for lower-priced health insurers or for insurers with higher
quality. Our analysis focuses on the estimation of the price sensitivity of con-
sumers.
In the German social health insurance market risk-bearing health insurers
competeforenrolleeswhoareallowedtoswitchbetweencompaniesonareg-
ular basis.In contrast to other countries with open enrolment such as Switzer-
landortheNetherlandstheenrolmentperiodisnotrestrictedtotheendofthe
year.Clients may switch at the end of each month if they stayed at their insur-
ance company for at least 18 months or if the company has raised the pre-
mium.
German social health insurers calculate income-dependent premiums that do
not correspond to individual risks.Instead,they set contribution rates and cli-
ents’ payments are equal to salaries times the contribution rate, up to an in-
come ceiling.Half of the premium is paid by employers;the other half is paid
byemployees.Premiumsarepaiddirectlytotheinsurancecompanies.Inprin-
ciple, it is mandatory for all employed workers to acquire social health insur-
ance.Yet,whenthesalaryexceedsathreshold2thepersoncanchoosewhether
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1 At least in the Netherlands,health care reforms were based explicitly on Enthoven’s concept.to remain in the social health insurance system or to opt out and acquire pri-
vate health insurance.In this paper we do not address the choice between so-
cial and private health insurance but focus on the choice within the social
health insurance system.I.e.our analysis does not explain the total number of
clients in the social health insurance system,but is based on the market shares
of insurance companies within this system.
The number of competing health insurance companies in Germany is quite
high.3Overall,therewere282companiesin2004.Somecompaniesoperateon
a national level, whereas the majority of health insurers operate in some re-
gions only. Furthermore, access to several company-based health insurers
(BKK)andguild-basedhealthinsurers(IKK)isrestricted.4Dependingonthe
respective region (mostly states or Bundesländer), consumers can choose be-
tween50and100healthinsurancecompanies.Thus,onerequirementforman-
aged competition to work is clearly fulfilled: consumers have free choice be-
tween many insurers.
By legal restriction,competition among insurance companies is almost exclu-
sively based on price (contribution rate), since more than 95 percent of the
benefits package is standardized across companies. Only for some services,
such as alternative medicine, it is up to the insurance company to decide
whether or not and to what extent to include these services in the benefits
package (Greß et al. 2005). Moreover, as a matter of principle, health insur-
ance companies are obliged to contract collectively with all licensed health
care providers. Legal opportunities to contract selectively are very limited.
Hence, the quality of insurance is basically identical among companies and
thus our analysis focuses on price differences,exclusively.
Consumers’pricesensitivityhasbeenanalyzedbefore,forGermanyaswellas
for other countries. Schwarze/Andersen (2001) use German micro-data and
provide a descriptive analysis of the socioeconomic background of switchers
and non-switchers. Another study found that member losses and member
gains of health insurers are closely correlated with contribution rates (Greß et
al.2002).Moreover,price elasticities of market shares between 1996 and 2001
were found to be quite high (–2.90) and increasing over time (Schut et al.
2003). This study by Schut et al. (2003) is quite closely related to ours. How-
ever, they use data on health insurers aggregated by type of insurer and esti-
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2 This threshold generally is somewhat higher than the income ceiling used for the calculation of
the individual premiums,e.g.in 2004 persons with a monthly income of 3 862.50 ¤ were allowed to
choosebetweenprivateandsocialhealthinsuranceandtheincomeceilingwasequalto3487.50¤
per month.
3 In the remainder the term health insurer only refers to social health insurers.
4 For a more detailed description of the origins of the quite peculiar German health insurance
market see for example Greß et al.(2004).mate a static panel data model only.Studies on price elasticities in other social
health insurance markets in Switzerland and in the Netherlands found much
smallerpriceelasticities(Beck2004;Schut,Hassink2002;Schutetal. 2003).5
Inourpaperweapplyarangeofeconometrictechniquesnotappliedtothere-
search question before,in particular,we analyze dynamic models.Modeling a
dynamic process seems to be more appropriate than a static one because only
a small number of consumers is inclined to decide on their health insurer each
period and therefore the market is likely to display persistence.We use a new
datasetwhichcoversaquiterecentperiodandisbasedonacompletepanelof
individual health insurers. So far, a complete panel has been available on an
aggregated level only. Therefore our panel data on the level of individual
health insurers is unique.Our findings support the notion that consumers dis-
play a distinct sensitivity to differences in contribution rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set
that has been collected for analyzing price sensitivity of consumers and sec-
tion 3 specifies the econometric models used. Our estimation results are pre-
sented in section 4.Finally section 5 concludes.
2. Data
This study is based on a complete panel of all individual health insurers that
were active in the German social health insurance market between January
2001 and April 2004.6 For each health insurer the panel includes the contribu-
tion rate and the number of enrollees in each of seven waves. These seven
waves are unequally spaced.The panel also contains information about merg-
ersbetweenhealthinsurers.Inouranalysis,mergedcompaniesareconsidered
to be new entrants into the market,i.e.we use an unbalanced panel.
Because health insurers are not obliged to publish information on the number
of enrollees,data had to be collected by Dostal & Partner,a commercial mar-
ket research company which is specialized in analyzing the German health in-
surance market.The data have been validated by comparing them to informa-
tion which was provided by several branch organizations of health insurers
and by the Federal Ministry of Health.It is the first time that a complete panel
of individual health insurers has been constructed. As a consequence, our
panel covers the complete German social health insurance market. Other
studies on price elasticities in Germany were only able to base their analysis
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5 TherehavebeenseveralstudiesonhealthplanchoiceintheUSgrouphealthinsurancemarket.
Estimated out-of-pocket elasticities range from –0.2 (Feldman et al.1989) to –1.8 (Royalty,Solo-
mon 1999).
6 Only those health insurers are excluded that did not have open enrolment and whose members
were not allowed to switch – e.g a health insurer for miners and one insurer for sailors.on aggregated data or on information about individual companies that cov-
ered only a small part of the market (Schut et al.2003).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics about the development of contribution
rates of health insurers.The mean of the contribution rate increased over the
whole period while the standard deviation decreased only after 2003. The
spread between the lowest and the highest contribution rate is quite large. In
2004 switching from the company with the highest to the one with the lowest
contributionrategeneratesacombinedannualsavingof2300¤foranindivid-
ual and his employer if salaries meet the maximum income ceiling. However,
mostofthehealthinsurersoperateonaregionallevel.Accordingly,thespread
of contribution rates is much smaller in most regions. Thus, potential savings
might be much smaller but are still substantial.
Table 2 describes the concentration of the market on a national level.Some of
the biggest insurance companies lost market shares over time. Accordingly,
themarketshareofthebiggest10andthebiggest5companiesdeclinedsome-
whatfrom2001to2004.Onanationallevel,thebiggestcompanyhasamarket
share of 11 percent.
3. Empirical Framework
3.1 The Model
The focus of this study is the choice among health insurers within the German
social health insurance system.Hence,this company-data based analysis tries
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Contribution rates of health insumers
2001 – 2004;%
1/2001 1/2002 7/2002 1/2003 7/2003 1/2004 4/2004
Mean 12.83 13.18 13.29 13.56 13.68 13.74 13.77
SD 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.87 0.85 0.77 0.75
Min 11.2 11.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
Max 15.3 14.9 14.9 15.7 15.7 15.7 15.7
Authors’ calculations.
Table 1
Concentration of the social health insurance market
market shares of companies in %
1/2001 1/2002 7/2002 1/2003 7/2003 1/2004 4/2004
Top 10 59.8 59.2 58.3 57.7 56.8 56.5 56.5
Top 5 43.8 43.2 42.5 42.0 41.0 40.7 40.7
Min < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Max 12.5 12.4 12.0 11.8 11.4 11.3 11.2
Authors’ calculations.
Table 2to explain the market share of health insurer i in timets it , .The number of in-
surers in the market is N.To account for the fact that the endogenous variable






















surance companies. In our basic specification xit solely consists of the contri-
bution rate pit. The parameter γ i captures unobserved heterogeneity across
insurance companies, andε it is a random error term. Taking logarithms leads
to a quite convenient linear representation of the model,
(2) log( ) ,..., . sx i N it it t ii t =′ + + + = βδ γ ε 1
δt captures the logged numerator of equation (1) which is a time specific con-
stant. By estimating a time-fixed-effects model any variation that is purely
across periods and that affects all companies alike is removed.
Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatthemarketsharesofhealthinsurersareul-
timately determined by consumers’ decisions.Our specification (1),therefore,
directlyrelatestoadiscretechoicemodelforindividualconsumers(fordetails
see Scanlon at al. 2002). However, consumers are not forced to explicitly de-
cide on their health insurer each period and many are likely to avoid transac-
tionandinformationcostsbysimplystayingwiththeircurrentinsurerwithout
consideringanyalternative.Therefore,themodelshouldaccountforpotential
persistence of market shares and,correspondingly,is augmented by including
the lagged endogenous variable on the right hand side
(3) log( ) log( ) ,..., , ss x i N it it it t ii t =+ ′ + + + = − αβ δ γ ε 1 1
with01 ≤≤ α capturingthedegreeofpersistence.Theresultingdynamicmodel
exhibits two quite interesting limiting cases.
Ifα=0holds,the model coincides with the simple static one.This corresponds
to a world where each individual decides on its health insurance each period.
Since company specific effectsγ i reflect that the probability of being chosen
systematically differs across companies, any persistence in market shares is –
besides persistent deviations in premium rates – then solely due to these dif-
ferences. Transitory variation in xit, i.e. in the contribution rate, has only
short-term and no long-term effect on market shares.
8 Stefan Greß, Marcus Tamm, Harald Tauchmann and Jürgen WasemIfincontrastα=1holds,marketsharesarenon-stationary,followingarandom
walk.Hence,evenifcontributionratesremainedstablenoequilibriumofmar-
ket shares exists and only changes in market shares but not their level can be
explained.Consequently,transitory changes in the explanatory variables have
permanent effects on market shares. A health insurer, for instance, which
looses members because of a relatively high contribution rate,will not be able
to attract them again by simply closing the premium gap. By closing the gap
the insurer will only be able to prevent more clients from leaving. Finally, in
the intermediate case () 01 << α transitory variation in explanatory variables
haslong-lastingeffectsonmarketshares.However,theseeffectsfadeoutover
time.
In correspondence to this discussion one might formulate different measures
for consumers’ price sensitivity.Our primary interest is on short-run premium
elasticities of market shares ηit, which are directly comparable to the results
obtained from earlier work based on static models. According to our model














sp ≡= − () . 1
β p denotes the coefficient referring to the contribution rate. In addition we
are interested in long-run effects, i.e. in dynamic multipliers
∂∂α η log( )/ log( ) , sp T t iT it
T
it =>
−1 that capture the effect of a transitory
change in the contribution rate on future market shares and ultimately the

























Here the approximation is accurate for small s it. Obviously, for the static
model,(5)equals(4)sincechangesinthecontributionrateonlyhaveinstanta-
neouseffects.Incontrast,forα=1thelong-runeffectofapermanentchangein




ing conventional panel data techniques,this does not hold for the unrestricted
dynamic specification. Therefore this subsection shortly discusses several
methodological aspects for estimating this type of dynamic panel data model.
An intuitive and more detailed survey on these models is given in Bond
(2002).




T→∞Byconstruction,inequation(3)therighthandsidevariablelog( ) s it−1 iscorre-
latedwiththecompositeerror() γε ii t + ,leadingtoinconsistentestimates,even
if individual heterogeneity is accounted for by either fixed- or random-effects
(e.g.Baltagi 2001).When employing a simple instrumental variable estimator
(Anderson,Hsiao 1982) consistency can be achieved under the assumption of
seriallyuncorrelatederrorsε it.Thisestimatorisbasedonfirst-differencingthe
regression equation and using twice lagged dependent variables as instru-
mentsfor∆ log( ) s it−1 .If,however,thenumberofwavesexceedsthreeandany
explanatory variables xit are taken into account,the IV-estimator’s efficiency
can substantially be improved by using higher-order lagged endogenous vari-
ables (i.e.log( ), log( ) ss it it −− 34 ,...instead of only log( ) s it−2 ) and – potentially –
past, present and future values of xit as additional instruments. This model is
estimated within a GMM framework (Arellano, Bond 1991 for details). For
GMM, the number of valid instruments varies whether the explanatory vari-
ables xit are exogenous,predetermined or endogenous with respect to the er-
ror termε it.That is,whether cov( , ) xit i ε τ = 0holds for any t andτ,only forτ≥t,
or just forτ>t,respectively.
Fortunately,as long as the model is over-identified,Sargan tests are available
for testing the validity of the underlying assumptions (the so-called moment
conditions) and therefore serve as a basis for selecting an appropriate specifi-
cation. The basic Sargan test (Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982) examines whether
the whole set of moment conditions is valid,e.g.if the instruments used for es-
timation are valid and, hence, orthogonal to the error term. By contrast, the
difference Sargan test focuses on the validity of the additional moment condi-
tions and the additional instruments, only. The difference Sargan test is ob-
tained by comparing the Sargan statistics of a restricted and an unrestricted
model, the restricted also including the additional instruments and moment
conditions.7
In this paper estimation of GMM is implemented using an efficient two-step
procedure8. The conventional standard errors obtained from two-step GMM
are likely to be underestimated in small samples. However, this can be ad-
justed for by using a corrected variance estimator proposed by Windmeijer
(2005). This corrected variance estimator has been shown to exhibit at least
equally good properties as the variance estimator obtained from one-step
GMM(Bond,Windmeijer2002).Henceforth,inthereminderweonlypresent
corrected standard errors and focus on two-step GMM.
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7 In the sequel we stick to the conventional notation and refer to (difference) Sargan tests, al-
though we actually present Hansen’s J-statistic based on robust estimates. Hansen’s J-statistic is
preferable due to bias of the original Sargan statistic in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
8 The second step is based on a weighting matrix which is estimated from the results of a consis-
tent first step estimation.All variants of GMM estimators discussed so far – likewise the simple Ander-
son-Hsiao IV-estimator – are based on moment conditions specified in terms
of first-differenced equations (first-differenced GMM). Unfortunately, if α is
close to unity,first-differenced GMM might suffer from small sample bias and
imprecision,andoftenperformspoorly.Itmightthereforebelesssuitedifhigh
persistence is prevailing,as is the case with our data.System GMM (Arellano,
Bover1997)exploitsadditionalmomentconditionsspecifiedintermsoflevels
rather than differences and is a potential solution to the problem. However,
the additional moment conditions are valid only if certain assumptions on ini-
tial conditions are satisfied, i.e. the error term in the first period,ε i 1, and the
first-differenced exogenous variables, ∆xit, have to be uncorrelated with the
individual specific effectγ i (Blundell,Bond 1998).Once again,these moment
conditions can be tested on the basis of (difference) Sargan tests.
From the above discussion it becomes obvious that a rather large number of
different GMM specifications can potentially be used for estimating the
model.Therefore,the following section presents estimation results for several
specifications and additionally discusses our strategy how to select the most
appropriate one.
Unfortunately,ourpaneldataisunequallyspaced.Thismightleadtoinconsis-
tent estimates,both in the GMM case and in the case withα=1,as long as one
insists that one period in the theoretical model has to coincide perfectly with a
certain time span in the empirical data.9 Under this assumption, McKenzie
(2001) shows that the model is misspecified by a simple AR(1) process.
First-differencing as well as including fixed-effects, therefore, fails to remove
the individual heterogeneity. Since GMM is quite data consuming we never-
theless precede using all data available, i.e. the 7 unequally spaced waves,
though keeping this problem in mind.Therefore we also check our results by
comparingthemtothoseobtainedfromareducedsamplewhichonlyincludes
waves 2 to 6 (Appendix B).These waves are equally spaced at semi-annual in-
tervals.
4. Results
This section provides the estimation results of our empirical analysis of mar-
ketsharesofhealthinsurersinGermany.Weconsiderseveralregressionmod-
els.First,we present a static panel data model where the market share of each
individual company is determined by company specific individual effects and
currentcontributionratesandneverdeviatesfromequilibrium.Then,wecon-
sider a dynamic model where the market share follows a stationary first-order
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9 This assumption is likely to be regularly violated in survey data,since the date of interview will
vary for practical reasons.autoregressiveprocess,i.e.marketsharesarepersistent,yetdifferencesincon-
tributionratescanleadtolong-lastingchangesintheshareswhichfadeoutaf-
ter some time.Finally,we provide results for a model where market shares are
considered to follow a non-stationary unit-root process() α=1 ,i.e.differences
in contribution rates lead to permanent changes in market shares and,hence,
the model explains first differences of market shares.In order to discriminate
between the stationary and the unit-root process we also provide results of
panel unit-root tests.Subsequently,we test for differences in price elasticities
for different types of insurance companies and for varying time periods.
4.1 Static model
First,we present the results of a static panel data model.The market share of
each individual company is solely determined by its current contribution rate
and by company specific individual effects. The company specific effects rep-
resent unobservable factors of health insurers which influence consumers in
their choice between companies and which might be correlated with the con-
tribution rate.Examples for such factors not included in the data are the num-
ber of branch offices, the quality of service the insurers provide, or any addi-
tional medical treatments not compulsorily covered by the standard benefit
package which,however,are covered by some of the companies.
Thesituationcanbemodeledasinequation(2).Here,itisassumedthatthein-
dividual specific effects are invariant over time. Depending on the assump-
tions on the correlation between individual specific effects and contribution
rates the model can either be estimated using random-effects or using
fixed-effects. The random-effects specification is clearly rejected by a
Hausman test (Hausman 1978). Therefore we only present results of the
fixed-effects panel data model.As can be seen in Table 3 the sign of the coeffi-
cient of the contribution rate is negative but the coefficient is clearly insignifi-
cant. I.e. after controlling for company specific effects the contribution rate
has no influence on the market share.
4.2 Dynamic models
4.2.1 Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
The dynamic model is equivalent to a world where only some consumers de-
cideaboutstayingwiththeirhealthinsurerorchoosinganewone.Ourestima-
tion is based on equation (3).We compare several specifications based on dif-
ferent moment conditions or sets of instruments.
Before reporting the GMM estimates we shortly mention the results of a sim-
ple OLS regression and of a panel fixed-effects model (within-group-estima-
tor) which both include the lagged market share as explanatory variable.The
12 Stefan Greß, Marcus Tamm, Harald Tauchmann and Jürgen WasemOLS estimates for the coefficient on the lagged market share are known to be
biased upwards, whereas for the panel fixed-effects model they are known to
be biased downwards. Hence, the two point estimates 1.0053 and 0.8122 (Ta-
ble8intheAppendix)mightserveasupperandlowerboundforthetruecoef-
ficient.10
The first two specifications in Table 4 are based on an Arellano-Bond type
first-differenced GMM estimator. In column 1 we present the results for a
specification where the contribution rate is assumed to be predetermined,all
available instruments are used and the estimation is done by two-step GMM
(GMM1).The contribution rate has a negative effect on the market share but
is clearly insignificant and the lagged market share has a coefficient (α) close
to one. Furthermore, the statistic of the Sargan test is highly significant, indi-
catingthatsomeofourover-identifyingrestrictionsarenotvalid.Atestwhere
the matrix of possible instruments has been reduced to a minimum, i.e.
∆ log( ) s it−1 and ∆xit are instrumented by only one instrument each, indicates
that the additional restrictions are not valid since the difference-Sargan test is
significant (χ () . 25
2 4576 = ).
Yet,when the contribution rate is treated as endogenous (GMM2) the Sargan
statistic becomes insignificant at the 5%-level.The difference-Sargan test be-
tween GMM1 and GMM2 is significant and clearly confirms these findings
(. ) () χ 5
2 1738 = . Therefore, we conclude that the contribution rate indeed is en-
dogenous. In GMM2 the estimated coefficient for α is lower than before but
stillrelativelyclosetounityandthecontributionrateisinsignificant.Sincethe
first-differenced GMM model is only weakly identified ifαis close to unity we
might favor the system GMM estimator in this case.Therefore,we now go on
considering an Arellano-Bover type system GMM estimator which includes
additional moment conditions and therefore allows identification of the
model even ifα is close to unity.
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Panel fixed-effects estimates for static model
Coefficient Std.error






Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. Huber-White robust
standard errors given.– ***Indicates significance at 1% level;**at 5% level;*at 10% level.
Table 3
10 This procedure has been proposed and applied in Bond (2002),at least for models without ad-
ditional explanatory variables.The system GMM estimates are also provided in Table 4.We see that in all of
thesystemGMMmodelsthecoefficientforthecontributionrateissignificant
and of much higher magnitude than in the first-differenced GMM models.As
before,we once more start with a specification where the contribution rate is
assumed to be predetermined (GMM3). These estimates show highly signifi-
cant Sargan statistics. This Sargan statistic for invalid assumptions does not
drop to an insignificant level if either (i) the matrix of possible instruments in
reduced (not reported),nor if (ii) the contribution rate is considered to be en-
dogenous (GMM4).For GMM4 a comparison with GMM2 indicates that the
additional moment conditions in the system GMM are rejected to be valid at
the 10%-level (difference-Sargan test:χ () . 10
2 1707 = ). This might indicate that
the market shares observed in the first period systematically deviate from
equilibrium shares conditional on contribution rates and individual effects.
Taking into account that changes between insurance companies were heavily
restrictedifnotimpossibleforconsumersbefore1996,itisquiteplausiblethat
thesemarketconstraintsledtostrongdeviationsfromequilibriumundermar-
ket conditions which had not been neutralized until our data sample starts in
2001.Hence,system GMM seems to rely on inappropriate assumptions in the
case analyzed here.
Summing up,due to the Sargan tests these findings are in favor of the first-dif-
ferenced GMM specification including the contribution rate as endogenous
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GMM estimates for dynamic panel data model









Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Market share
in t–1 0.9798*** 0.0751 0.9525*** 0.0378 1.0123*** 0.0191 1.0453*** 0.0220
Contribution rate –0.0034 0.0545 –0.0413 0.0451 –0.1187*** 0.0387 –0.1715*** 0.0307
Observations 1221 1221 1588 1588
AR(1) –3.32*** –3.87*** –4.16*** –4.41***
AR(2) 0.12 0.16 –0.05 –0.12








15.77 (14) 17.07* (10)
Authors’calculations.–Regressionincludestimedummiesforeachwave.Two-stepGMMestima-
teswithcorrectedstandarderrors(Windmeijer2005).AR(1)andAR(2)aretestsforfirst-andse-
cond-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (Arrelano, Bond 1991). (Differ-
ence) Sargan statistics areχ
2 distributed;number in brackets behind difference Sargan test provi-
des the number of restrictions/degrees of freedom. – ***Indicates significance at 1% level; **at
5% level; *at 10% level.
Table 4regressor (GMM2), although being close to a unit-root process and, hence,
poor precision of the estimates.
4.2.2 Model in first differences
In this subsection we finally provide the results for a model as in equation (2),
however in this case our dependent variable is not the market share but the
firstdifferenceofmarketshares,∆ log( ) s it .Thisreferstoaworldwheretransi-
tory differences in contribution rates lead to permanent changes in market
shares.Once a consumer changed his insurance company he will stay with the
new company as long as no further differences in contribution rates prevail or
any unsystematic effects occur.In the long-run there are no insurance compa-






be due to death rates that vary across companies.In fact,an F-test on joint sig-
nificance of the company specific fixed-effects is highly significant indicating
that a fixed-effects model (UR2) is preferable to a simple OLS regression
(UR1).Resultsforthefixed-effectsaswellastheOLSregressionareprovided
in Table 5. In both models the contribution rate is highly significant and the
magnitude is comparable.
However,taking into account the results from the GMM estimates in the pre-
ceding subsection one might doubt if the contribution rate is exogenous.
Therefore we instrument the contribution rate by its own lagged value and
provide the results of IV estimations in Table 5, too. In the case without
fixed-effects (UR3) we only observe a very small change in the coefficient for
the contribution rate. Yet, a test for endogeneity11 indicates that the variable
indeed is endogenous.In contrast,in the case with fixed-effects (UR4) the co-
efficient for the contribution rate almost doubles, there however a test for
endogeneityisinsignificant.Hence,weregardUR2asourpreferredspecifica-
tionintheclassoftheunit-rootmodelsandfocusfurtherdiscussiononUR2.
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11 The test for endogeneity proposed in Wooldridge (2002) is based on the estimated residual
from a regression of the instrumented variable on all other exogenous variables.These estimated
residuals are then included in the original regression. The instrumented variable is concluded to
be endogenous if the estimated residuals have significant explanatory power in the original re-
gression.4.2.3 Unit root tests
Whether the parameterαtakes the limiting value of unity is a crucial question
for both the theoretical model and the adequate estimation procedure. Our
GMM estimates indicate that α is at least close to unity. Unfortunately,
first-differenced GMM12 is ill-suited for testing the null-hypothesis of a
unit-root being present, since the model is not identified under the null. For
this reason,additional panel unit-root test are carried out.Two distinct regres-
sion-based test procedures are considered which both are well suited for pan-
els with a large number of cross-sectional units but a small number of waves.
One test is based on a simple OLS regression of market shares on their lagged
values.This leads to consistent estimates under the null.The second test (pro-
posed by Breitung,Meyer 1994) specifies the regression in terms of deviations
from initial conditions and therefore,is likely to be more powerful if the vari-
ance of the individual effects is high.Otherwise,it may lose power in compari-
son to simple OLS (Bond et al.2002).Table 6 displays the test results for mar-
ket shares and for contribution rates.
Results for the contribution rate are quite clear.The unit-root case is rejected
by both tests. Hence, there is no need to formulate the model in terms of
changes in contribution rates in order to avoid spurious regression.This result
is quite plausible from the view-point of economic theory. By the use of
time-fixed-effects the model is implicitly formulated in terms of deviations
from cross-section means.13 In fact, deviations form average prices cannot be
non-stationary, since market forces will always impose pressure on price dif-
ferences.
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Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Contribution rate -0.0890*** 0.0089 –0.0814*** 0.0130 –0.0960*** 0.0093 –0.1670*** 0.0495
Observations 1589 1589 1589 1589
R² 0.1493 0.1484





Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. Huber-White robust
standard errors given.– ***Indicates significance at 1% level;**at 5% level; *at 10% level.
Table 5
12 ThehighlysignificantSarganstatisticsindicate,however,thatsystemGMMisnotconsistent.
13 These issues are slightly more involved in the case of unbalanced panels (Wansbeek,Kaptyen
1989).Unfortunately, the different tests yield different results for market shares.
WhilesimpleOLSclearlyrejectsthehypothesisofaunit-rootbeingpresentin
the series of market shares,the Breitung-Meyer test does not reject the null at
any plausible level of significance. Therefore, these test results do not unam-
biguously answer the question whether the model has to be formulated in
terms of first differences of market shares or as a more general dynamic one.
Taking together the information from these panel unit-root tests and the esti-
mated results from our GMM specification (GMM2) and the specification of
first-differenced market shares with fixed-effects (UR2), we conclude that
both are quite similar. Although being found to be only weakly identified in
comparable cases, the GMM2 estimates of α are not significantly different
from one and therefore overlap with the unit-root case.Furthermore,the con-
fidence interval of the estimate for β in GMM2 includes the point estimate of
the other specification (UR2).Hence,these results are comparable.We prefer
the results of UR2,mostly because of identification problems with GMM2 in
small samples and its low precision in terms of large standard errors,but go on
presenting further results for both specifications. The preference for UR2 is
reinforced by the results based on waves 2 to 6, only, i.e. the equally spaced
panel (Appendix B).
4.3 Model extensions
In order to check sensitivity of the price sensitivity of market shares with re-
spect to (i) the chosen time period,(ii) the type of health insurance company,
(iii) open vs. restricted enrolment in companies, and (iv) regional restrictions
of insurance companies we estimate several models where we include interac-
tion terms between contribution rate and time, type of insurance company,
and other group indicators, respectively. These sensitivity checks are per-
formed for our preferred models from the above specifications, i.e. GMM2
and UR2.
Sensitivityofpriceelasticitieswithrespecttotimeisanalyzedfortwoseparate
cases. First, we check for a time trend of the coefficient for the contribution
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Panel Unit-Root Tests
Market share Contribution rate
Simple OLS Breitung-Meyer Simple OLS Breitung-Meyer
Coefficient lagged value 0.9844 1.2094 0.8743 0.9309
t-statistic –6.2956 5.5407 –9.2923 –4.9029
p-value
(one sided t-test)
0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. Regressions with/
without uniform constant yield similar results.Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors given.
Table 6rateandthenweestimatethecoefficientfortwodifferenttimeperiods,i.e.the
baseline coefficient represents waves 1–4 and an interaction term is included
forperiod2whichrepresentswaves5–7.Fordetailedresults,seeTable9inthe
Appendix.Inbothspecifications,theGMMmodelseemstoargueinfavorofa
recent increase in consumers’ price sensitivity, while the unit-roots specifica-
tion does not indicate any significant change. Nevertheless, the insights from
the GMM models are weak.F-tests on the overall price effect in later periods
do not indicate a significant price sensitivity. That is, in model GMM2a, the
sum of the coefficient for the contribution rate and the interaction term be-
tween contribution rate and period 2 being different from zero is rejected
(: . ) , HF p pp e r i o d 0 2 1 324 00 6 2 ββ += = and . In the specification with time
trend (GMM2b), a comparable F-test (: ) Ht p pt r e n d 0 0 ββ +⋅ = is also insignifi-
cant for 0 < t ≤ 7.
We distinguish five types of insurance companies which are large regional
companies (Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen AOK), two types of substitute
companies (Ersatzkassen für Angestellte EAN and Ersatzkassen für Arbeiter
EAR), guild-based insurance companies (Innungskrankenkassen IKK), and
company-based insurance companies (Betriebskrankenkassen BKK).The lat-
ter is our reference group.In the specification for the unit root case as well as
intheGMMcase,theinteraction-termsbetweencontributionrateandtypeof
insurance company are all insignificant both individually and jointly (Table 10
in the Appendix).
As already national, most companies operate only in one or few regions.
Hence, the relevant market of companies with local restrictions is much
smaller and might restrict their potential to attract new clients.Yet,our results
show no significant differences in consumers’ response to contribution rates
between companies with and without regional restrictions (Table 11 in the
Appendix).
AlthoughbeingabletooptforopenenrolmentsomeoftheBKKandIKKde-
cide to have restricted enrolment. This is due to their roots as company- and
guild-based insurance companies respectively. Hence, only those consumers
working at the company or being member of a certain profession are eligible
to enroll in these insurance companies,though are not forced to do so.There-
fore, the relevant market of these companies is much smaller than of those
with open enrolment.However,we do not see any differences between these
companies either (Table 12 in the Appendix).
4.4 Elasticities
After having discussed several specifications for estimating the effect of price
onmarketshare,wenowpresentthepremiumelasticitiesofmarketsharesim-
plied by the estimated coefficients. The point estimates of the elasticities and
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UR2 are given in Table 7.The short-run premium elasticity is based on equa-
tion (4) and calculated for the sample mean.
The point estimates of the elasticity for the static model and for GMM2 are
both negative, however, due to insignificance of β p, they are not significantly
different from zero. Yet, our preferred estimate for UR2, i.e. the unit-root
specification with fixed-effects, is significant. At the one hand, UR2 is pre-
ferredtothesimpleOLSunit-rootspecification.Attheother,itdisplaysmore
robust results and by far smaller standard errors than competing dynamic
specifications estimated using GMM.Moreover,it is favored against the static
model.Finally,estimatespresentedintheprecedingsubsectiondonotarguein
favor of including interaction terms of the premium rate and other explana-
tory variables in the model.
AtsamplemeanUR2displaysashort-termpremiumelasticityofaboutminus
one. This indicates a distinct sensitivity of consumers to differences in contri-
bution rates.Thus a crucial precondition for managed competition to work is
fulfilled.
5. Conclusions
This paper provides two important elements that advance insights in the dy-
namics of the German social health insurance market. First, it is based on a
unique panel data set which covers the social health insurance market com-
pletely on the level of individual insurance companies.Prior to this study,only
data on an aggregated level with very few observations were available. Sec-
ond,this paper uses an advanced econometric technique which takes into ac-
count the dynamics of the market. So far, studies on price elasticities in the
German social health insurance market have been based on static models
only.
The econometric analysis favors a dynamic model which explains changes in
market shares by the level of premiums. For this specification we obtain a
short-run premium elasticity of market shares of approximately minus one.
This indicates a moderate short-run sensitivity of consumers to differences in
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Estimates of the short run premium elasticity
Static Model GMM2 UR2
Mean Premium elasticity –0.06 –0.55 –1.09
95%-confidence interval –0.78 +0.66 –1.74 +0.64 –1.43 –0.75
Authors’ calculations. – Elasticity estimated for sample mean. Estimation based on result from
Tables 3,4 and 5.
Table 7contribution rates. Compared to earlier analyses dealing with the German
case, e.g. Schut et al. (2003), our elasticity is smaller than the one estimated
there. Interestingly, our results are much closer to those obtained for other
countries like Switzerland (Beck 2004). However, from the point of view of
economictheory,theestimatedshort-runpricesensitivityappearstoberather
smallkeepinginmindthatconsumerscanchoosebetweenalmostperfectsub-
stitutes; for perfect substitutes the price elasticity should approach infinity.
Hence,one might hypothesize that different health insurers are not perceived
as perfect substitutes by many consumers.
Yet,in contrast to earlier analyses our results are based on a dynamic specifi-
cation. Our results indicate that market shares follow a unit-root process or
are,atleast,closetonon-stationarity.Thatis,evenifthepricesensitivitymight
appeartoberathermoderateintheshort-term,inthelong-runpermanentrel-
ative changes in contribution rates will have dramatic effects on the market
shares of health insurers. Insurers which permanently charge contribution
rates that are higher than those of competitors and do not offset this by being
attractive to consumers for other reasons than price, will ultimately drop out
of the market.However,this process might take some time.
Clearly,we have been able to show that consumers exert their right to choose
among social health insurers, that the choice is sensitive to price, and that
therefore major conditions for managed competition to work are fulfilled.
Furthermore,our results show that this will – at least in the long-run – impose
substantial pressure on health insurers.In other words,“the prospect of being
hanged” is real. Yet, it is less clear whether this will ultimately lead to en-
hanced efficiency as intended by the reform of 1996. Other – possibly more
promising – strategies to reduce the premium are available,e.g.risk selection
strategies (Jacobs et al.2002;Behrend et al.2004).Analyzing gains and losses
in efficiency,therefore,remains a topic for future research.
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OLS and within group estimates for dynamic panel data model
OLS Within group estimation
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error
Market share in t-1 1.0053*** 0.0027 0.8122*** 0.0558




Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. Huber-White robust
standard errors given.– ***Indicates significance at 1% level;**at 5% level;*at 10% level.
Table 8
Estimation of differences in price sensitivity by time period
Time trend 2 separate periods
GMM2a UR2a GMM2b UR2b
Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Market share
in t-1 0.8398*** 0.0661 1 fixed 0.8557*** 0.0544 1 fixed
Contrib.rate –0.0062 0.0585 –0.0978*** 0.0118 –0.0165 0.0507 –0.0785*** 0.0120
rate · trend –0.0094* 0.0059 0.0017 0.0027
rate · period 2 –0.0313** 0.0157 0.0090 0.0095
Observations 1221 1589 1221 1589
Sargan test 39.34* (27) 37.71* (27)
Authors’calculations.–Regressionincludestimedummiesforeachwave.Period2includeswaves
5–7, i.e. waves 1–4 are the omitted categories. Sargan statistics areχ
2 distributed; number in bra-
ckets provides the number of over-identifying restrictions/degrees of freedom. – ***Indicates si-
gnificance at 1% level;**at 5% level;*at 10% level.
Table 9
Estimation of differences in price sensitivity by type of insurance company
GMM2c UR2c
Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Market share in t-1 0.9449*** 0.0345 1 fixed
Contrib.rate –0.0502** 0.0207 –0.0835*** 0.0117
rate ·  AOK –0.0052 0.0633 0.0600 0.0732
rate ·  EAN 0.0097 0.0213 0.0365 0.1054
rate ·  EAR 0.0192 0.0299 0.0172 0.0818
rate ·  IKK 0.1030 0.1545 0.0433 0.0503
Observations 1218 1585
Sargan test 77.96 (74)
F-test (all interactions = 0) 0.36 0.38
Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. Omitted type of insu-
rance company (baseline) is BKK.– ***Indicates significance at 1% level;**at 5% level;*at 10%
level.
Table 10Appendix B – Equally spaced time periods
As mentioned in subsection 3.2 estimation of dynamic panel data models
might lead to inconsistent estimates if panel waves are unequally spaced.
Therefore we reduce our data set to waves 2 to 6, i.e. to the waves collected
semi-annually between January 2002 and January 2004, and compare the re-
sults with those reported above.
The two unit-root tests do not unambiguously discriminate betweenα=1and
α<1,either.Inthissetting,theGMMestimatesareevenweakerthanthosere-
portedforthelargerpanel.TheSarganstatisticishighlysignificantinallofthe
models, rejecting the underlying orthogonallity assumptions altogether. Yet,
the point estimates of the coefficient are within the range of the results ob-
tained from estimating the model using the whole sample. For the unit root
case (corresponding to UR2) the point estimate for β p is somewhat closer to
zero (–0.0530) but still highly significant. If only five semi-annually spaced
panelwavesareconsidered,resultsdonotqualitativelychangewithrespectto
time period, type of insurance company, regional restrictions or open vs. re-
strictedenrolment.Estimationresultsbasedonthereducedsampleconsisting
of regularly spaced waves,therefore,do not challenge the main findings of our
analysis.
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Estimation of differences in price sensitivity by regional restriction of insurance companies
GMM2d UR2d
Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Market share in t–1 0.9766*** 0.0690 1 fixed
Contrib.rate –0.0496 0.0479 –0.0873*** 0.0219
rate ·  regional market only –0.0149 0.0310 –0.0349 0.0232
Observations 856 1096
Sargan test 51.43 (42)
Authors’ calculations. – Regression includes time dummies for each wave. – ***Indicates signifi-
cance at 1% level;**at 5% level;*at 10% level.
Table 11
Estimation of differences in price sensitivity between insurance companies with open and re-
stricted enrolment
GMM2e UR2e
Coef. Std.error Coef. Std.error
Market share in t–1 0.9455*** 0.0440 1 fixed
Contrib.rate –0.0318 0.0730 –0.0854*** 0.0121
rate ·  no open enrolment 0.0020 0.0375 –0.0035 0.0033
Observations 1122 1435
Sargan test 83.86*** (42)
Authors’ calculations. –Regression includes time dummies for each wave. – ***Indicates signifi-
cance at 1% level; **at 5% level;*at 10% level.
Table 12